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"I've written again and again how measures like two-factor authentication aren't going to make electronic banking any more secure. The problem is if someone has stuck a Trojan on your computer, it doesn't matter how many ways you authenticate to the banking server; the Trojan is going to perform illicit transactions after you authenticate.
"It's the same with a lot of our secure protocols. SSL, SSH, PGP and so on all assume the endpoints are secure, and the threat is in the communications system. But we know the real risks are the endpoints.
"[...]
"I'm reminded of the post-9/11 anti-terrorist hysteria -- we've confused security with control, and instead of building systems for real security, we're building systems of control. Think of ID checks everywhere, the no-fly list, warrantless eavesdropping, broad surveillance, data mining, and all the systems to check up on scuba divers, private pilots, peace activists and other groups of people. These give us negligible security, but put a whole lot of control in the government's hands.
"Computing is heading in the same direction, although this time it is industry that wants control over its users. They're going to sell it to us as a security system -- they may even have convinced themselves it will improve security -- but it's fundamentally a control system. And in the long run, it's going to hurt security."
-- Bruce Schneier,
"Security in Ten Years" (a conversation with Marcus Ranum)
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vvalkyri
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(no subject)
It is, however, disingenuous to put two-factor authentication in the same category as what the TSA does. Consider these two attacks:
1. attacker has control of your computer right now
2. attacker steals your password, but does not currently have control of your computer
Two-factor authentication creates a distinction between these two cases: in case 1, the attacker can still do whatever they like, but in case 2 (which is extremely common due to keylogging and the like), they are helpless. If the attacker wants to use my account to send spam or to reset my bank account password, they only have the narrow window when I'm actually on the computer in which to do it; and since I'm on the computer specifically to pay attention to that account, they will have to go to a lot of extra trouble to keep me from noticing that activity.
Google's two-factor authentication meant I was, if not comfortable with, at least not horrified by the prospect of using internet cafes when my wife and I went on our honeymoon last year, which in turn meant I didn't need to carry an extra 5 pounds of laptop on a backpacking trip if I wanted to be able to keep up with business back home.